

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

June 20, 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. K. Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: W. White, Pantex Site Representative
SUBJECT: Pantex Plant Activity Report for Week Ending June 20, 2003

DNFSB Activity Summary: W. White was on leave Wednesday and was on site for the remainder of the week.

Restart of B83 Rebuild Operations: On Wednesday, NNSA briefed BWXT on the results of the NNSA readiness assessment of the B83 rebuild process. A prior readiness assessment for this process by NNSA was suspended in April when NNSA determined sufficient problems existed with the operating procedures to warrant correction of those procedures prior to continuing the readiness assessment. At that time, PXSO sent a letter to BWXT noting the procedural deficiencies and expressing concern that these deficiencies were not identified during BWXT's contractor readiness assessment. BWXT corrected the procedures and performed a contractor readiness assessment to verify their adequacy prior to asking for a resumption of the NNSA readiness assessment.

Their were no pre-start findings from this NNSA readiness assessment and no findings related to procedural adequacy. The NNSA readiness assessment team identified six post-start findings. These findings included a tool that did not conform to design drawings, deficiencies in the required reading file for the B83 technicians, the lack of a basis for the periodicity of a site-wide technical safety requirement surveillance, deficiencies related to implementation of combustible loading requirements, a weapon component that was not evaluated in the combustible loading disposition document, and the absence of any criteria for transition-to-operations plans. The last finding related to the absence of a plant standard for transition-to-operations plans has arisen in several recent readiness assessments. BWXT is working to develop a standard for these plans. [II.A]

B61 Command Disablement Operations: On Monday, BWXT held an out brief for its contractor readiness assessment of B61 command disablement operations. There were nine pre-start findings and four post-start findings. The pre-start findings included deficiencies in the implementation of combustible control requirements, the absence of required weapon response to support the authorization basis, a missing tamper seal for one of the testers, inadequate knowledge of the technicians with respect to certain hold point criteria, concerns with the timing of certain activities following the command disablement, and procedural issues that could affect verbatim compliance. There were also observations related to the transition-to-operations plan for B61 command disablement operations. [II.A]

Transportation during Lightning Warnings: On Tuesday, PXSO issued a safety evaluation report approving authorization basis changes to allow the transportation of W62, W78, W87 and W88 units during lightning warnings when these units are transported in the larger enhanced transportation cart (ETC I). These programs join the W76 as the only programs whose transportation configurations in an ETC I have been approved for transportation during lightning warnings. The approval is based on the protection provided by the ETC I and weapon response from the design agency. The single pre-start finding relates to a discrepancy in the W62 configuration drawing number referenced in the weapon response vice the drawing number referenced in the authorization basis changes. A contractor readiness assessment will be necessary to verify required procedure changes, Move Right System changes, training, etc. prior to lifting the restriction on transportation of these units during lightning warnings. [II.A]